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Abstract 
In India, the politics of development took the shape of the World 
Bank influenced housing policy for the urban poor. It was a recipient as well 
as an accomplice to the politics of development. 
Globalisation induced development brought opportunities and growth in 
metropolitan cities and towns, thereby, triggering large-scale urban 
migration. Since rapid urban migration surpassed rising demand for urban 
shelter, the government initially acted as the sole provider of subsidised 
housing for the urban poor. Due to multiple shortcomings, it withdrew from 
its role and became an enabler of World Bank’s housing policy for the urban 
poor. The World Bank’s attempt at urban development by lending to the 
urban poor for urban housing missed the point that the urban poor should be 
consulted for their views on their development. This paper uses a bottom-up 
approach to understand how the politics of development is countered by the 
subjects of development. 
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Introduction 
 Since time immemorial, cities and towns have been hubs of business, 
trade, and commerce. They are the loci of globalisation, development, and 
urbanisation. This holds true in India too. The opportunities and opulence 
that globalisation and development bring induces urban migration. Migrants 
from rural areas come to urban spaces in search of livelihood every year. In 
India, the rapid urban migration surpassed the rising demand for urban 
shelter. This exacerbated the crisis of urban housing particularly among the 
poor and lower-middle income families who not only made up the greater 
part of urban settlers in developing countries but also lacked the capacity to 
pay for decent housing (Rondinelli 1990: 153). The crisis of urban housing 
was partly resolved through occupation of pavements, and illegal 
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construction of slums or squatter settlements on public property, near places 
of work or business. The poor migrants in Olga Tellis case (1981) argued 
that encroachment of public property was not a choice but an economic 
compulsion for personal survival (Mody 2013: 80). Thus, the extent of urban 
housing deficiencies and the expansion of slum and squatter settlements 
across urban areas was (and is) a critical indicator of swelling urbanisation.  
 In view of the spread of urbanisation, the task of the government 
should be to enable poor families to access decent housing. Urban housing 
deficiencies, a by-product of globalisation and development, questioned the 
role of the state- whether it should be a provider of finished housing or a 
promoter of housing delivery system. By the end of the Fifth Five Year Plan, 
the national shelter policy shifted from the state being the sole provider of 
shelter to an enabler of World Bank housing policies. The shift implied a 
change from subsidized to non- subsidized or less- subsidized forms of 
accommodation. The policy shift meant a shift from need-based to demand-
based approach to urban poor shelters (Wadhwa 1988). Hence, the state 
could withdraw from direct investment in housing programs as well as 
impose the market upon the urban poor for shelter.  
 The World Bank’s entry revolutionised housing policies in India. 
Using the neoliberal paradigm, the Bank introduced free market and 
demand-based approach to housing loans for urban poor. This approach 
marked a shift from the earlier statist need-based approach where the poor 
where given finished constructions and subsidies. Thereby, the earlier 
schemes were designed to cater to the housing needs of the urban poor 
whereas the later schemes were geared to cater to demands for housing of the 
poor (Wadhwa 1988: 1762). The World Bank’s attempt at urban 
development by lending to the urban poor was not unproblematic. The 
attempt was steered to re-organise on a global scale and re-produce social 
inequalities and vulnerabilities (Weber 2004: 189). The Olga Tellis case 
(1981) saw the inclusion of right to shelter as a fundamental right but left it 
to the government to implement the same. The withdrawal of the government 
from providing housing to private takeover of the task implied that the 
fundamental right had to be purchased in order to be accessed. 
 The urban poor were never consulted in matters of their own 
development. The shift from ‘need based’ to ‘demand based’ housing created 
the grounds for resistance among the urban poor against the global financial 
institution. This paper utilizes a bottom-up approach, as opposed to the usual 
top-down perspective on development, to understand how politics of 
development is countered by the subjects of development. It explores the 
nature of resistance to the Bank’s endeavours in urban housing by the urban 
subaltern using the case study of Chennai. 
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Understanding Need-based Approach and Demand-Based Approach in 
Urban Housing Policy  
 A reliable indicator of urbanisation is the growing urban housing 
sector. For a long time, India did not prioritise the housing sector. Housing 
was deemed to belong to social welfare sector rather than economic sector 
(Sivam and Karuppannan 2002: 84). Corollary, less financial resources were 
allotted to housing (Mehta and Mehta 1991; Gupta et al. 1993; Smets 1997, 
1999). Before independence, there were no efforts to address the crisis of 
housing of marginalised groups. After independence and till the Fifth Five 
Year Plan (1974-1979), the government provided housing to the urban poor. 
Starting from the Sixth Five Year Plan (1980-1985) and particularly the 
Eighth (1992-1997) and Ninth Five Year Plans (1997-2002), the government 
withdrew from its role as a provider of housing. Around the same time, the 
World Bank entered the business of providing shelters to India’s urban poor. 
The Bank, disgruntled with the schemes of subsidy, influenced India’s 
housing policy which witnessed a gradual change from need-based to 
demand-based approach (Wadhwa 1988; Anand 1992). Put simply, there was 
shift from the “delivery of a packaged product to a progressive development 
model” (Sivam and Karuppannan 2002: 70). Now, the government assumed 
the role of a facilitator creating conditions for interaction between external 
finance and the target urban poor.  
 
The concept of ‘need’  
 What is ‘need’? The concept of ‘need’ refers to a product or a service 
in relation to the functions or goals it is expected to fulfil. Need may be 
defined in terms of essential utility, without reference either to income of the 
household or prices of the commodity, which is required by and large 
(Wadhwa 1988: 1762). Need is neither determined by choices in the market, 
and prices of goods and services nor dependent upon income. Need stems 
from an indispensable purpose. There are minimum three basic questions to 
ascertain whether a product or a service qualifies as ‘need’ (Wadhwa 1988: 
1762). These are: 
1. Whether the product or service is necessary  
2. If yes, the quantity that is required, and  
3. Who determines the need 
 In case of shelter services, expected objectives in needed shelter will 
shape the estimate of type and quantum of housing required. Under resource-
stress, estimates could be used to prioritise ‘needs’ in relation to the 
objectives which should be fulfilled first and those which could be left for 
the long run. Moreover, needs may be determined by an individual or a 
household, planners or the government, and the society (Wadhwa 1988: 
1762). In this paper, the perspectives of the planners or the government and 
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slum dwellers will be taken into account to understand politics of 
development from above and resistance to the same from below. 
 
The concept of ‘demand’  
 The concept of ‘demand’ belongs to the discipline of economics. 
Here, demand belongs to the realm of free market economy. Demand is 
determined on the basis of consumer’s choice and price. Consumer’s choice 
need not include the judgment of society or benchmarks laid out by planners 
and/or government (Wadhwa 1988: 1762). Being a matter of choice, 
consumer may demand for some products and not for others. This means that 
the product does not have an essential property- life would not turn harsh in 
its absence. Fulfilment of demand requires the interplay of suppliers and 
consumers. The divergence between need and demand became the reason for 
government intervention 
 
Transformation from Need-based Approach to Demand-Based Approach  
 In 1960s and 1970s, the ‘need-based’ approach to urban housing 
emerged as the product of planners’ and/or government’s perception of the 
needs of urban poor. Having recognised housing as a basic need, under this 
approach the primary objective entailed making urban housing affordable 
through subsidies and making credit on soft terms and direct price controls. 
At the macro level, the norm of housing was set at one dwelling unit per 
household. It would be impossible for the urban poor to avail of the 
prescribed standard norm unless they were offered subsidies. The planners 
realised that if the urban poor were to afford this basic need, they should be 
offered higher subsidies. Further, the capital cost of infrastructure would 
have to borne by the government and the beneficiaries could be levied user 
charges for maintenance or improvements. In short, the housing policies in 
this approach were not oriented to ‘capability to pay’ of the urban poor 
(Wadhwa 1988: 1763). 
 The ‘need-based’ approach was riddled with several loopholes. The 
housing schemes seemed to be based on the assumption that need for 
housing of a household was related to the income of the household instead of 
its size. By emphasising on the criterion of income of the household, the 
target group found the housing schemes unaffordable and unacceptable. 
These schemes helped the rich and middle income groups to misappropriate 
housing meant for the urban poor. The low income groups could be assigned 
smaller subsidies and consequently, smaller houses, while the rich could be 
allotted larger houses. Thus, the definition of ‘need’ had a distinct class bias 
and failed to ameliorate the housing conditions of the urban poor (Wadhwa 
1988: 1762-3).  
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 The aforementioned government failures to provide housing to the 
urban poor marked a shift from ‘need-based’ approach to ‘demand-based’ 
programmes. The shift relieved the government from “the major 
responsibility of providing housing to the poor themselves and reserve for 
itself the role of a mere 'facilitator'” (Wadhwa 1988: 1764). The 
transformation was coupled with the dominance of institutions for housing 
policies. During 1970s, the Union government transferred the responsibility 
of all social housing schemes and housing needs of a state’s population 
(except subsidised housing for plantation workers) to the respective state 
governments (Wadhwa 1988: 1763). In the same year, the Housing and 
Urban Development Corporation Limited (HUDCO) was set up by the Union 
government under the supervision of the Ministry of Housing and Urban 
Poverty Alleviation . The HUDCO was entrusted with the task to cater to the 
financial needs of state housing boards, and agencies concerned with 
providing housing. All these institutions not only employed a ‘balance sheet’ 
approach to the issues of housing but were also interested in full-cost 
recovery. They reduced the quantum of subsidies based on the capability of 
state governments or cross-subsidisation by the housing boards.  
 After the entry of World Bank into India’s shelter programmes, the 
urban housing policy changed radically. According to Pugh (1990), the 
World Bank reinforced ‘capability to pay’ approach whereby it was argued 
that the “squatter area upgrading, very low standard serviced sites... housing 
solutions [we]re within or nearly within the means of poor households" 
(Wadhwa 1988: 1763). The urban poor, according to World Bank estimates’, 
could afford to expend 20 to 25 per cent of their income on urban housing 
(Wadhwa 1988: 1763). Thereafter, the World Bank shaped urban housing 
programmes both at the point of entry at the project level as well as through 
massive funds to route programmes via existing organisations.  Needless to 
say, finances came at the cost of conditions imposed by the Bank. Gradually, 
urban housing policies moved away from subsidy or ‘need-based’ approach 
to full-cost recovery or ‘demand based’ approach.  
 
The Changing Course of Shelter Policies: Revisiting Five Year Plans 
 The planned housing policies took off only after India’s 
independence in 1947. The state recognised that the public sector ought to 
intervene directly and positively role in housing for the urban poor because  
...it is not possible for private enterprise by itself to meet the housing 
needs of the lower income groups. The economic rent for even the 
minimum standard of accommodation is altogether beyond the means 
of the working class and a large section of the middle classes 
(Government of India 1952: 209-210; Sivam and Karuppannan 2002: 
71).  
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 The issue of urban housing for the urban poor was included in the 
First Five Year Plan (1951-56) itself.  
The basic problem was thus defined as an economic one in terms of the 
gap between affordability and housing costs (Government of India 
1952: 209-210; Sivam and Karuppannan 2002: 71).  
 With the First Five Year Plan, the state undertook responsibility to 
provide housing to low-income groups. In the beginning, the government 
was the sole provider of finished social housing schemes and various other 
programs through the subsidized Housing Scheme for Industrial Workers 
(1952), Housing for Low Income Group (1954), and Housing Scheme for 
Plantation Workers (1956). However, studies showed that houses constructed 
by public agencies for the urban poor were unaffordable and mostly 
appropriated by the middle- and higher-income groups. Besides, the total 
number of houses constructed by the public agencies under various schemes 
was too few to ameliorate the housing conditions of the urban poor. Thus, 
the First Five Year Plan failed miserably to meaningfully cater to urban 
housing for the economically weaker sections (Sivam and Karuppannan 
2002: 71). 
 In the Second Five Year Plan (1956-61), the government adopted the 
view that slums were a painful sight in the urban landscape. It pursued the 
policy of slum clearance and rehabilitation of housing. The idea behind this 
policy was borrowed from the West which barely considered the root causes 
for emergence of slums and the problems of housing delivery (Wadhwa 
1988). Like the First Five Year Plan, this Plan failed simply because “it did 
not take into consideration the situation of acute shortage of housing stock. 
On the contrary, it sought to demolish existing stock” (Sivam and 
Karuppannan 2002: 71).  
 In the subsequent Third Five Year Plan (1961-66), emphasis was laid 
on identifying causes behind disappointment in the previous housing 
programs. The shelter schemes reached out to only to a small segment of the 
total population of slum dwellers. In Delhi, the program could reach only 
20.66% of the target population (Singh 1992). The problem with the shelter 
schemes was that they directed the construction of resettlement colonies in 
the peripheral areas of the cities, which (Rondinelli 1990: 158-9): 
1. increased the distance between places of work and residence, and  
2. increased the cost of travel between places of work and residence 
3. rarely solved the housing problems of most of the poor and in many 
cases, only aggravated it 
 The policy of relocation overlooked the fact that slum dwellers 
preferred to live closer to workplaces (Jagannathan and Haider 1990) and 
maintain access to income-earning opportunities. Thus, they returned to 
places close to work and sold off whatever shelter they owned. 
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 During the Fourth Five Year Plan (1969-74), the government of India 
initiated schemes for environmental improvement and up-gradation of slums, 
and sites and services. Based on theories of self-help advanced by Turner 
(1967, 1972, 1976), Mangin (1967) and Abrams (1964), these schemes had 
mixed success. For example, the sites and services scheme and squatter 
improvement program helped in income distribution to poor households in 
Chennai (Pugh 2000).  
 During the Fifth Plan (1975-80), housing schemes for high-income 
groups were included under cross-subsidisation. As a result, the State 
Housing Boards and Development Authorities were required to implement 
composite housing schemes incorporating all income brackets - 
economically weaker section, low income groups, middle income groups and 
high income groups. Again, the poor hardly benefited from this policy 
(Ansari 1989). Ansari (1989) found that the Housing Boards spent about 
85% for middle income groups (MIG) and high income groups (HIG), and 
meagre 8% and 7% for low income groups (LIG) and economically weaker 
section (EWS) for housing respectively.  
 The shift in the government's approach to housing policy began in the 
Sixth Five Year Plan. Till the Fifth Five Year Plan, the government provided 
subsidized housing to select weaker sections of the society. It was still a 
need-based approach to housing for urban poor. From the Sixth Five Year 
Plan (1980-85), housing subsidy policy underwent change. The World Bank 
became involved in urban housing policy and launched sites and services 
schemes oriented “for direct public sector assistance for housing the EWS” 
(Sivam and Karuppannan 2002: 72). The public sector continued to provide 
subsidised housing to the weaker sections provided but on the capacity to 
repay. This approach was carried forward in the Seventh Five Year Plan 
(1985-1990) during which the National Housing Policy (NHP 1988) was 
formulated “reiterating more financial responsibility on the part of individual 
households” (Sivam and Karuppannan 2002: 73). With the Eighth Five Year 
Plan (1992-1997) and Ninth Five Year Plan (1997-2002), housing policies 
became greatly market-oriented, that is, markets would act like a facilitator 
instead of direct involvement in construction of housing (Sivam and 
Karuppannan 2002: 73). These Plan documents, inclusive of policy 
framework for legislative, fiscal and financial systems, transformed the role 
of government from the provider of finished housing to a promoter of 
housing delivery system in urban and rural areas. The role of the government 
now was that of an enabler to World Bank housing policies. Hence, it could 
withdraw from direct investment in housing programs.  
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Table1. Investment in housing over plan periods 
Five year plan Total plan outlay 
(million Rupees) 
Total housing 
outlay 
(million Rupees) 
Percentage of total 
plan outlay 
First (1951-56) 19,600 385 1.96 
Second (1956-61) 46,720 900 1.93 
Third (1961-66) 85,790 1,100 1.28 
Fourth (1969-74) 157,790 1,890 1.20 
Fifth (1974-79) 394,260 4,940 1.25 
Sixth (1980-85) 975,000 13,020 1.34 
Seventh (1985-90) 1,800,000 24,530 1.36 
Eighth (1992-97) 4,341,000 49,230 1.06 
Ninth (1997-02) 8,592,000 ΝΑ ΝΑ 
Source: Government of India, Five Year Plans, First to Ninth, Planning Commission, New 
Delhi. Also, Sivam and Karuppannan 2002: 76 
 
 The shift from subsidy approach to market approach implied that the 
urban slum/pavement dwellers would have to partake of the market, however 
expensive it might be. Since the Sixth Five Year Plan, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) too found a role to play in community development 
programs (Sivam and Karuppannan 2002: 73). 
 
The Right to Shelter: A Market- based Right  
 The fulfilment of basic needs occupies an important place in the 
discourse on human rights. Basic needs range from food, clothing, shelter, 
education, health and more. Taking the issue of shelter for urban poor as the 
concern of this paper, the Supreme Court ruled in the famous Olga Tellis vs 
Bombay Municipal Corporation (henceforth referred to as Olga Tellis) that 
the right to shelter was a fundamental right. Consequently, the Supreme 
Court brought socio-economic rights under Part III of the Constitution, that 
is, it brought the non-enforceable ‘second generation rights’ under the 
umbrella of enforceable fundamental rights (Mody 2013: 78).  The judgment 
of the Supreme Court not only reflected on the status of right to shelter but 
also provided a new socio-economic dimension to Article 21 (Sripati 1998: 
413; Mody 2013: 78).  Shelters were not free but needed to be purchased, be 
it for poor or rich. If accessibility to shelters was based on purchasing power, 
it provided the cause to resist macro policies of the World Bank and the state 
on urban housing for the poor.  
 Since time immemorial, cities or towns have been hubs of business, 
trade, and commerce. These cities or towns became the main drivers of 
economy as well as boast of creation of opulence. This was true in 1980s 
Indian metropolitan cities or towns. Metropolitan cities or towns were also 
sites of rural-to-urban migration. In Mumbai, lakhs of migrants came from 
rural areas in search of livelihood every year. Most of the urban migrants 
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were poor which largely explained their departure from rural areas in pursuit 
of wage work. They lived in slums near places of work or business.  
 The resistance to politics of development emerged when the then 
chief minister of Maharashtra, A R Antulay, ordered for slum clearance in 
July 1981. He announced that those migrants who failed to possess photo-
passes would be forcefully deported to places of origin or taken away from 
Mumbai. The responsibility of slum clearance was with the Bombay 
Municipal Corporation (BMC) assisted by the Commissioner of Police. The 
Municipal Commissioner of Bombay resorted to Sections 312-14 of the 
Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 (the BMC Act) to legally remove 
the informal shelters. Under Section 314, the Municipal Commissioner had 
authority to eradicate the encroachments without prior notice. In protest, the 
slum/ pavement dwellers in Mumbai submitted writ petitions before the 
Supreme Court of India to challenge the constitutional validity of Section 
312-14 of the BMC Act (Mody 2013: 79). This case was known as Olga 
Tellis vs Bombay Municipal Corporation (Olga Tellis).  
 In the courtroom, slum/ pavement dwellers wished to reinforce the 
right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. They 
argued that Article 21 was meaningful only when it included the right to 
livelihood.  They had migrated precisely to earn the basic means of 
sustenance, “living on pavements close to their workplace as possible was 
vital to their survival” (Mody 2013: 79). What became apparent was that the 
petitioners in Olga Tellis used the argument for right to livelihood and not 
the right to live on pavements. Rather, the issue of encroachments on 
pavements was derived out of the right to livelihood. They resisted 
classification as trespassers, “since they occupied pavements not by their 
choice, but due to economic compulsion. The situation was of dire necessity 
and it compelled them to use public property for personal survival” (Mody 
2013: 80). In defense, the BMC contended that the demolition drive was 
carried out in public interest. It asserted that “great care was taken to ensure 
that no harassment is caused to pavement dwellers by evicting them” and 
attributed the increase in crime rates and risk of traffic accidents, 
environmental degradation, spread of contagious diseases, and many 
dangers, to slum settlements across the city (Mody 2013: 80).  
 In the final judgment, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of BMC. It 
outlined that Section 314 of the BMC Act cannot be struck down for it 
provided autonomous decision-making authority to the Municipal 
Commissioner to evict illegal encroachments (Mody 2013: 82). It opined that 
no one had the right to encroach upon land earmarked for public purpose 
(Mody 2013: 82). However, the Hon’ble court agreed that eviction of 
slum/pavement dwellers led to loss of livelihood. For the first time, the court 
recognised that right to life included right to livelihood. It also ruled that the 
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statutory body should provide for alternative accommodation, implement 
socio-economic policies, schemes for rehabilitation, and positive measures 
for equal treatment of the neglected in society (Mody 2013: 83). Moreover, 
the court recognised right to shelter as a fundamental right, thereby, bringing 
socio-economic rights under Part III of the Constitution. Over the years, the 
judgment on Olga Tellis became an oft referred precedent in similar cases, 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation vs Nawab Khan Gulab Khan, Shanti –
star Builders vs Narayan Totame (Mody 2013: 83). 
 The Supreme Court judgment assured that the municipal body would 
provide alternative shelter to the destitute. The judgment made the state 
responsible for provision of shelter but it did not specify how it would do so. 
The procedure was left at the discretion of the state. In the course of the Five 
Year Plans, the state’s shelter policy shifted from being the sole provider of 
shelter to World Bank intervention, that is, from subsidized to non- 
subsidized or less- subsidized forms of accommodation. The policy shift had 
a significant impact on the urban poor: firstly, it forced the urban poor to 
enter the market for shelter, and secondly, it delineated a shift from need-
based to demand-based approach to urban poor shelters (Wadhwa 1988). At 
the micro level, the urban poor experienced the entity called state through 
realities of slum demolition drives, role of the judiciary and introduction to 
capitalism. At the macro level, the World Bank found the urban poor as the 
source of bank income in the context of global crisis of capitalism (Weber 
2004). With cognition that the new-found fundamental right to shelter 
contingent upon purchasing power, the stage was set for the urban poor to 
contest the politics of development. 
 
Politics of Development: The World Bank and Urban Development 
 The core function of the World Bank revolves around ‘poverty 
reduction’ worldwide.  The objective behind the agenda of poverty reduction 
is development. According to Leftwich (2008), poverty reduction is rooted in 
politics. In this kind of politics, it is the task of the donors to  
identify, nurture, encourage and support those social and political 
forces which are necessary for forming the kinds of growth coalition 
which will demand, design and implement the institutional 
arrangements which will deliver pro-poor growth and social provision 
(Leftwich 2008: 3). 
 Such politics includes activities ranging from cooperation, 
negotiation and conflict in decisions about the use, production and 
distribution of resources, then  
the politics of development is about changing not only how resources 
are used, produced and distributed, but also about how decisions are 
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taken about such changes and about the politics which sustain, 
implement and extend them (Leftwich 2008: 10). 
 Poverty reduction is about politics and development. Using the 
logic of a=b and a=c then b=c, ‘politics of development’ may be defined 
as (Leftwich 2008: 10):  
(a) When people change the way they use, produce and distribute 
resources, they also change their (social and political) relations 
– relations of power - with each other; and  
(b) When people change their political and social (power) relations 
with each other, they usually change the way they use, produce 
and distribute resources. 
 An example of the above would be the Bank’s efforts in urban 
development, particularly financing housing policies for urban poor. 
Through the site and services (S&S) programme, the Bank intends to alter a 
state’s shelter policies, and concomitantly, the relations of power between 
the state and the people, the state and the Bank, and the Bank and the people.  
 The Bank constructed the urban housing policy through the lens of 
neo-classical economics. Earlier, the state housing policy aimed to replace 
earlier “‘unacceptable’ and ‘sub-standard’ living conditions with 
‘acceptable’ and ‘formally planned’ solutions” (Anand 1992: 2045). It 
implied slum clearance followed by building apartments for slum dwellers 
(Anand 1992: 2045). However, the Bank heavily criticised the state 
sponsored huge subsidies and sought to reform the housing policy under 
neoliberal approach (Mayo et al. 1986). The neoliberal approach encouraged 
free markets, industrialization, and profit accumulation. In the context of 
housing policy, it meant the elimination of subsidies and the introduction of 
affordability-cost recovery-replicability model. Subsidies served as an index 
of measurement of ‘need’ for housing. Through subsidies, the need could be 
taken care of a wide base of poor urban migrant. With the introduction of 
neoliberal approach, the thrust was on ‘full cost recovery’ of the Bank or the 
‘capability to pay’ of the urban poor. Thereby, the emphasis shifted from 
“potential for developmental roles by the state” to individual capacity 
(Anand 1992: 2045; Pugh 1990) as well as need based to demand based 
approach (Wadhwa1988). 
 The question is, why should the World Bank involve itself in urban 
development in Third World countries? The business of urban development 
is part of the World Bank discourse on ‘poverty reduction’. However, the 
neoliberal approach to urban development (and urban housing policies in 
particular) aids in the “(re)-organization of global capitalism” (Weber 2004: 
357). Like poverty reduction agenda, urban development becomes an 
instrument in liberalization of financial sector and re-production of social 
risk (Weber 2004: 357). The S&S programme for housing, contingent upon 
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increased access to credit, get embedded in private international commercial 
law. The “'demand for credit” has two implications (Weber 2004: 377)  
1. It produces social vulnerabilities for the urban poor who become the 
subject for neoliberal projects, and  
2. It re-formulates ‘needs’ in terms of ‘demand’ 
 While the first leads to global organization of poverty, the second 
indicates “banking on the poor” (Weber 2004: 380). The purpose of 
“banking on the poor” was precisely to mitigate and manage the crisis of 
global capitalism (Weber 2004: 379). The S&S programme for housing was 
tailored “Products and Services to the Needs of the Poor In the short-term” 
(Basu 2005: 4011) to bring the Bank closer to the urban poor. Hence, the 
urban poor were quantified and spoken of in “paramilitary terms: such as 
‘the target population’” (Collins and Lappe 1979: 853). The poor were never 
consulted in matters of their own development. Further, development was 
perceived to be achieved “only by bringing in external resources. Foreign 
investment is thought of as essential. Everything should be done, therefore, 
to develop a favourable climate for foreign banks and corporations” (Collins 
and Lappe 1979: 853). Particularly, the S&S programme was merely 
financial in nature. There were no provisions for skill building among the 
target population for better repayment (Jha 2000).  Lastly, the study of urban 
poverty was divorced from political, socio-logical and cultural factors. The 
study and measurement of urban poverty were relegated to economic and 
statistics. 
 Nevertheless, the Bank’s attempt to bank with the poor for its own 
interests was not unchallenged. The urban poor often refused to participate in 
the Bank sponsored politics of development or participated through local 
political party and party institutions. The next section will show how the 
politics of development is countered from below. 
 
World Bank Lending to the Poor: Countering Politics of Development 
Everyday Struggles of Subaltern: Sites and Services Schemes of World 
Bank  
 The World Bank’s first steps into India’s housing policy commenced 
with the sites and services (S&S) programme. The Bank claimed that the 
S&S programme was highly suited to affordability considerations and 
practical requirements of job security of the urban poor. This programme 
was upheld as the epitome of tailored housing package- it closely represented 
an individual's preference combination- which the urban poor would demand 
for and willingly purchase. During the early 1970s, the World Bank 
proposed the S&S schemes as the key to tide over the crisis of housing for 
urban poor in low-income countries. Within a span of three years (1972 and 
1975), the World Bank invested a whopping figure of US $ 106.3 million, 
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inclusive of credits and loans, in S&S programmes worldwide. World Bank’s 
scale of sponsorship and professional approach hinged on full-cost recovery 
transformed the previous Indian concept of S&S so much so that “the entire 
concept of site and services underwent a subtle but significant change which 
left it looking very much like a component' part of the World Bank lending 
system, complete with costs, benefits and its own jargon” (Wadhwa 1988: 
1765). However, the Bank sponsored programme did not find many takers. 
The housing constructions were either deserted by the urban poor or were 
obtained by higher income groups (Wadhwa 1988: 1765). The S&S 
programme proved to be quite a disappointment for the Bank. 
 The frustration of the programme was embedded in the Bank’s 
flawed assessment of lending to the urban poor. On examination, researchers 
found that the Bank over-estimated the magnitude of affordability of the 
urban poor. According the Bank’s calculation, the target poor could afford to 
pay 20 to 25 per cent of their income on housing (Wadhwa 1988: 1763). 
Since poor migrants wanted residence near places of work to save 
transportation costs, they would be willing to shell out for it. By giving 
overwhelming importance to location, the Bank overlooked that the poor 
earned their meagre wages mainly from the informal sector and spent most 
of the income on food and other basic necessities in a kind of lexicographic 
ordering (Wadhwa 1988: 1765). Further, the Bank delineated that the capital 
cost of services would be met by the government while the user-charges 
would be paid by the occupants. 
 The promise of locational affordability could not be kept by the 
Bank. The majority of preferred locations of the poor were near the main 
business centres of cities where the possibility of employment opportunities 
were high. In such locales, the land would be inevitably expensive and 
vacant land may not be available or if available, it would not be huge enough 
to chalk out plots for S&S projects (Wadhwa 1988: 1765). While trying to 
bank with the poor, the World Bank confronted with erroneous presumptions 
built into the S&S projects. The Bank’s failure doubled when the urban poor 
refused to participate in the S&S projects. Even if they participated, they sold 
off the assets to return to old shelters. As said earlier, the poor’s resistance to 
the politics of World Bank was not in the form of an overt movement. It took 
the form of everyday resistance, easily escaping visibility of the layman.  
 For the lower-income segments of India, there were two parallel 
systems to provide housing. These were the public and the private sector. 
Based on statistical figures, it was found that the public sector created not 
more than 16% housing stock in the country while the private sector 
constructed majority (84%) accommodation (Sivam and Karuppannan 2002: 
70; Garg, 1989; Government of India, 1992). In the private sector, there were 
two types of housing- formal and informal. Houses were unaffordable in the 
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formal housing market, be it the public sector or the private sector (such as 
the World Bank), which forced the urban poor to seek housing from illegal 
informal private sector in rural or unauthorized colonies. What the S&S 
scheme could not do, the illegal informal sector did. The latter provided 
affordable housing to the urban poor by giving land for free or at low cost 
(Sivam and Karuppannan 2002: 80; Ansari 1989). Thereafter, the shelters 
were built by slum dwellers themselves from waste materials. Thus, the 
resistance against the international development institution manifested 
through dependence on the illegal informal sector.  
 
 Turning to Political Parties: Case Study Chennai  
 In the Indian city of Chennai, slums were a common site. From 1975 
onwards, the World Bank attempted to transform the slum settlements in the 
city. By doing away with the costly in situ constructions near places of work 
of the urban poor, it aimed to put in place S&S model wherein slum-dwellers 
would be evicted from central areas of the city and relocated to the suburbs. 
Till 1986, the S&S projects provided large tracts of land with basic amenities 
to slum dwellers. It was left to the slum dwellers to construct their homes. 
Both the S&S projects and slum up-gradation projects accounted for more 
than 70% of total shelter lending (Buckley and Kalarickal 2006: 16-17; 
Raman 2011: 77). Like before, the S&S schemes were based on cost 
recovery and settlement tenure (Raman 2011). The Bank’s policy 
prescriptions were governed by “technocratic neo-liberalism” which, in the 
case of urban housing, referred to “deregulation of markets, privatisation of 
municipal services, affordability, cost recovery and replicability” (Raman 
2011: 77). Specifically, the Bank singled out Chennai to experiment its “new 
theories” (Pugh 1990: 186) and “new urban management initiatives” (World 
Bank 1984: v). 
 The Bank wished to re-orient land use planning and infrastructure 
provision in Chennai. It required the government to adopt the corporate 
management style- investment planning and efficient resource use- for urban 
housing (Pugh 1990: 178). It allocated a loan worth $24 million to begin the 
first Madras Urban Development Project (MUDP I) in 1977. Another loan of 
$42 million was offered to implement the second Madras Urban 
Development Project (MUDP II) between 1980 and 1988 (World Bank 1984: 
vi). Both MUDP I and II, allocated 65% of the funding to transport and 
shelter (Raman 2011: 77; World Bank 1989). In the third and last direct loan 
for shelter, the Tamil Nadu Urban Development Project (TNUDP), the 
World Bank allocated $255 million to the state between 1988 and 1997 
(Urban Development Report 2008; Krishnan 2007). 
 The ruling political party in Tamil Nadu at the time the World Bank 
began its operations in Chennai was Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK). 
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The secret behind DMK’s rise to and stay in power was the policy of 
distribution of short-term goods and services which attracted a wide gamut 
of people in the state. The urban poor supported the DMK whose short-term 
projects gave jobs and investment “quickly” to their supporters (Subrama-
nian 1999: 204-08; Raman 2011: 75). With the ruling party geared to 
strategically woo more voters, its state policies and bureaucracy were “made 
subservient to the party’s needs” so that the poor could avail the state 
resources through formal and informal channels (Raman 2011: 75). In case 
of shelter policies, the urban poor could expect to win favours by supporting 
DMK.  
 In India, the housing policies were under the purview of the central 
government since independence. Scholars shared the opinion that India 
lacked a single housing policy or multiple housing policies rather there were 
evolving ideas “on the proper role of the state in intervening in urban land 
and housing problems” (Revi 1990: 87; Raman 2011: 75). At first,   
government of India set very high standards for housing and infrastructure 
for the poor, symbolic of the aspiration of western-style modernity. By 
1970s, the central government fathomed that the policy of replacement of 
slums with high-quality modern homes was not a viable solution. It, 
therefore, retreated from the role of provider of constructed shelters to 
provider of conditions for self-help housing and in situ slum upgrading. The 
new official slum policy meant to “ameliorate the living conditions of slum-
dwellers as an immediate measure” (Sridharan 1995: 292; Raman 2011: 75). 
By the late 1980s, policy guidelines of the National Commission on 
Urbanisation and the National Housing Policy clearly stated that “the state 
should only be a facilitator of housing, not a builder” (Raman 2011: 76). It 
must be remembered that the World Bank had already entered the domain of 
India’s housing policy and the policy guidelines reflected what the World 
Bank required of the state- to be an intermediary between it and the poor. 
 The housing policies of the central government, if transferred to the 
states, could disturb the vote bank. In Tamil Nadu, DMK “strategically 
modified” the housing policies of the central government to retain the 
“support of key groups of slum-dwellers” (Raman 2011: 74). Though the 
World Bank needed the Tamil Nadu government to cooperate in realising 
S&S schemes, the latter stood by the state shelter policies which did not 
believe in eviction and resettlement. Instead, it pursued in situ tenement 
construction with “an informal tendency to protect and reward those groups 
of the urban poor (for example, fishermen) that the ruling party was trying to 
court for votes” (Raman 2011: 74). Corollary, the urban poor allied with the 
ruling party (and its vote bank politics) to thwart the initiatives of the World 
Bank. In order to identify themselves with the political party, the slum 
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tenements were named after the political leaders who built them such as 
“MGR” or “Kalaignar” (or “Amma” for supporters of AIADMK).  
 The state shelter policies were implemented through the Tamil Nadu 
Slum Clearance Board (TNSCB) created during the DMK regime. The 
TNSCB was established by the Tamil Nadu Slum Areas (Improvement and 
Clearance) Act of 1971. The TNSCB chairman was directly appointed by the 
(DMK) chief minister. The TNSCB chairman, Rama Arangannal, was 
bestowed with the “authority to allot plots and tenements owned by the board 
to ‘such slum dwellers whom he considered eligible’” (Raman 2011: 76). 
The Act did not clearly articulate the criteria for eligibility for tenement resi-
dents, “essentially giving the chairman the power to direct housing produced 
by the board to worthy supporters of the DMK, a power that the chairman 
used liberally” (Raman 2011: 76). During the early years of its formation, the 
TNSCB not only served as “a highly visible symbol of the DMK’s 
commitment to the urban poor” but also “as a vehicle of political patronage 
which funnelled goods from the state to ‘worthy’ voters” (Raman 2011: 77). 
As a result, the urban poor did not suffer from the fear of demolition, 
eviction, and resettlement. In short, they had a strong political recourse to 
counter the Bank’s drive for urban development. Consequently, the city 
became dotted with in situ tenements representing the alliance of advantage 
between the politically valuable slum dwellers and the ruling party. 
 The Bank made serious attempts to fundamentally amend shelter 
policies in Tamil Nadu. The Bank found the mushrooming slums “wholly 
irrational, and impractical” (Raman 2011: 77). Dubbing the phenomenon of 
burgeoning slums as a “crisis”, the Bank’s intervention sought to 
“rationalise” the state shelter policies (Raman 2011: 77). With the TNSCB 
acting as a weak partner, the shelter reforms were hard to come by. By the 
end of MUDP II, the Bank was fully aware of the obstacles to shelter 
reforms. Put in another way, democracy stood in the way of Bank’s approach 
to development. The urban poor resorted to the state government (DMK) and 
its allied institution (TNSCB) for protection of slums and were obliged in 
return for their votes. 
 
Conclusion 
 The objective of this paper was to study the resistance from below to 
the World Bank’s housing programmes. The paper provided a discussion on 
macro structures of power and the micro structures of resistance. It was 
found that the urban poor resisted either by refusing to invest in the Bank’s 
schemes or by allying with the regional ruling party to protect their interests. 
For the World Bank, the business of urban development in Third World 
countries like India entail “banking on the poor” to mitigate and manage the 
crisis of global capitalism (Weber 2004: 379). The national policy shift from 
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need based’ to ‘demand based’ approaches to housing schemes not only 
helped the state to withdraw from an active role of a provider but also 
facilitated the World Bank to re-organise global capital. As the market 
became the site for the realisation of the fundamental right to shelter, it set 
the stage for the urban poor to resist against the production of risks and 
insecurities.  
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